



S O C R A T I C IRONY 1 
" I r o n y . " says Quintîlïan, is that figure of speech or trope ' ' in which 
something contrary to what is said is to be understood " conlrarium a 
quod dichter intelligendum est' z His formula has stood the test of time. 
It passes intact in Dr Johnson's dictionary / ' m o d e of speech in 
which the meaning is contrary to the words"' [1755]), and survives 
virtuali) intact in ours: " Irony is the use of words to express 
something other than, and especially the opposite of. [their] literal 
mean ing" {Webster's , Here is an example, as simple and banal as 
I can make it: a British visitor, landing in Los Angeles in the midst 
of a downpour, is heard to remark, " W h a t line weather you are 
having he re . " The weather is foul, he calls it "'fine," and has no 
trouble making himself understood to mean the contrary of what he 
says. 
Why should we want to put such twists on words, making them 
mean something so different from their " l i te ra l" - i.e. their 
established, commonh understood- sense that it could even be its 
opposite? For one thing, humour. For another, mockery. Or. 
perhaps both at once, as when Mac West explains why she is 
declining President Gerald Ford's invitation to a state dinner at ihe 
White House : "It's an awful long way to go for just one meal. " The 
joke is on someone, a put-down made socially acceptable by being 
wreathed in a cerebral smile. 
A third possible use of irony has been so little noticed3 that there 
is no name for it. Let me identify it by oslension. Paul, normally a 
1 Originally written for the Β Club ofthe Classics Faculty of Cambridge Unïversitv, this cssav 
has been presented and discussed at Cornell 'as a Tovnsend Lecmre- and Columbia at a 
1 rilling Seminar . I thank those whose comments have Influenced the essay's present form. 
2 Instiiutio Oratonca 9.22.44. Much the same definition occurs at 6.2.15 a n c " 8.6.54. 
3 The .samples in Muccke, 1969: 15-19. several of them perfect gems, include no pure 
specimen of this variety. Neither in this nor ir. that other excellent book. Booth, :g74, is this 
dimension of irony noticed, fai less explored. 
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good student, is not doing well today. He stumbles through a 
tutorial, exasperating his tutor, who finally lets fly with, ' ' P a u l , you 
are positively brilliant today. '" Paul feels he is being consigned to the 
outer darkness. But what for? What has he done that is so bad? Has 
he been rambling and disorganized, loose and sloppy in his diction, 
ungrammatica l , unsyntactical, ill-prepared, uninformed, confused. 
inconsistent, incoherent? For which sub-class of these failings is he 
being faulted ? H e hasn't been told. He has been handed a riddle and 
left to solve it for himself. T h o u g h certainly not universal, this form 
of irony is not as rare as one might think. Only from its most artless 
forms, as in my first example, is it entirely absent. There is a touch 
of it in the second. M a e West puts us offteasingly from her reasons 
for declining that gilt-edged invitation. She is implying: ' ' I f you are 
not an utter fool you'll know this isn't mv real reason. Try guessing 
what that might b e . " 
λ\ hen irony riddles it risks being misunderstood. At the extreme 
the hearer might even miss the irony altogether. If Paul had been 
fatuously vain, sadly deficient in self-criticism, he could have seized 
on that remark to preen himself on the thought that he must have 
said somel/iing brilliant after all. l i so , we would want to say that the 
deception occurred contrary to the speaker's intent. For if the tutor 
had meant to speak ironically he could not have meant to deceive. 
Those two intentions arc at odds; in so far as the first is realized the 
second cannot be. T h a t in fact there was no intention to deceive 
should be obvious in all three of my examples. And that this is not 
a contingent feature of these cases can be seen by referring back to 
the definition at the start. Just from that we can deduce that if the 
visitor had meant to deceive someone - say. his wife back in London 
— into thinking that the weather just then was fine in L.A.. he could 
not have done it by saying to her ironically over the phone, ' ' T h e 
weather is fine over h e r e . " For to say this ironically is to say it 
intending that by " f i n e " she should understand the contrary; if she 
did. she would not be deceived : the weather in L.A. was the contrary 
of " f i n e " just then. 
This is so basic that a further example may not be amiss. A crook 
comes by a ring whose stone he knows to be a fake and goes round 
saying to people he is trying to dupe. " C a n I interest you in a 
d i a m o n d r i n g ? " T o call this " i r o n y " would be to confess being all 
at sea about the meaning of the word. Our definition tells us why: 
to serve his fraud the literal sense of " ' d i a m o n d " has to be the one 
he intends to convey. T o see him using the word ironically we would 
have to conjure up a case in which he did not have this intention 
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say, by his saying to his ten-year-old daughter with a tell-tale glint 
in his eye, "Luv. can I interest you in a diamond r i n g ? " Now 
suppose he had said this to her without that signal. Might we still call 
it " i r o n y " ? We might, provided we were convinced he was not 
trying to fool her: she is ten. not five, old enough to know that if that 
trinket were a diamond ring it would be worth thousands and her 
father would not let it out of his sight. If we thought this is what he 
was about - testing her intelligence and good s e n s e - w e could still 
count it irony: a pure specimen of the riddling variety. I t would 
not be disqualified as such if the little girl were to fail the test, for 
the remark was not made with the intention to deceive. Similarly. 
the tutor might have said " b r i l l i a n t " well aware there was a 
chance Paul might miss the irony and mistake censure for praise — 
knowing this and for good reasons of his own willing to take the 
chance. 
Once this has sunk in we are in for a surprise when we go back to 
the Greeks and discover that the intention to deceive, so alien to our 
word for irony, is normal in ils Greek ancestor eirôneia. eiröli, 
eiröneaomai.4 The difference is apparent in the first three occurrences 
of the word in the surviving corpus of Attic texts, all three of them 
in Aristophanes. In Wasps 174. cos ειρωνικούς refers to Plulocleon's 
lying to get his donkey out of the family compound to make a dicast 
out of him. In Birds 1211. it is applied to Iris for lying her way into 
the city of the birds. In Clouds 44g, e'ipcov. sandwiched in between two 
words for "'slippery.'' figures in " a catalogue of abusive terms 
against a man who is a tricky opponent in a lawsuit." 5 We meet 
more of the same in fourth-century usage. Demosthenes (/ Phil. 7) 
uses it of citizens who prevaricate to evade irksome civic dutv. Plato 
uses it in the Laws goiE] when prescribing penalties for heretics. 
The hypocritical ones he calls the eirönikon species of the class: for 
them he legislates death or worse; those equally wrong-headed but 
honestly outspoken are let off with confinement and admonition. In 
the Sophist* pronouncing Socrates' dialectic a superior form of 
sophistikF* Plato contrasts it with the run-of-the-mill sophistikë 
practiced by ordinary sophists: these are the people he puts into the 
eirönikon species of the art. Not Socrates, but his arch-rivals, whom 
Plato thinks imposters, are the ones he calls eirones (268A—B). 
4 On EÎpcou as a term of abuse • Schimpfwort} in the classical period see the groundbreaking 
paper by Ribbeck. 1876: 381IT. : it has not been superseded by the later studies, which I shall 
not be undertaking to review. 
5 Do \e r (196S) ad lo;. in his invaluable edition of the Clouds 
6 ή yévst γενναία σοφιστική ["the sophistry of noble lineage**), 321B. 
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How entrenched in disingenuousness is the most ordinary use of 
eirön we can see m the picture uf the eirön in Aristotle and 
Thcophrastus . Strikingly different though he is in each - odious in 
Theophras tus , amiable in Aristotle7 - in one respect he is the same 
in both 0 : he willfully prevaricates in what he says about himself. 
Aristotle takes a lenient view of such dissembling in the case of 
Socrates. Casting him as an eiron Aristotle contrasts him with his 
opposite, the braggar t [alazön), and finds him incomparably more 
attractive because the qualities he disclaims are the prestigious ones 
and his reason for disclaiming them — " to avoid pompousness " - is 
commendable LY.E. 11271323-6), though still, it should be noted, 
not admirable in Aristotle's view. When he expresses admiration for 
Socrates' personal character he shifts to an entirely different trait: it 
is for indifference to the contingencies of fate apatheia , not at all for 
Ειρωνεία, that he reckons Socrates " great-souled " {megalopsuclios, Po. 
An. q 8 a i 6 - 2 4 : cf. D.L. 6.2}. In Theophrastus the eiron is flayed 
mercilessly,9 portrayed as systematically deceitful,1 0 venomously 
double-faced. 1 1 adept at self-serving camouflage. 1 2 
This is how Thrasymachus views Socrates in that famous passage 
in which he refers to Socrates" "cus tomary " eirôneia: 
τι R. 3 3 / Λ : "Heracles ! " he said. "This is Socrates* habitual shamming 
είωθυΐα Ëipcoveia . I had predicted to these people that you would refuse to 
answer and would sham εϊρωνεύσοιο and would do anything but answer 
if the question were put to yon." 
T h r a s y m a c h u s is charging that Socrates lies in saying that he has no 
answer of his own to the question he is putting to others: he most 
certainly has. Thrasymachus is protesting, but pretends he hasn't to 
keep it under wraps so he can have a field-day pouncing on our^ and 
tearing it to shreds while his is shielded from attack. So there is no 
7 In the references to Socrates in the .V.E., E.E.. and λί.Λί . but perhaps not in the Rk(t.. 
where ειρωνεία is reckoned a "d i sda in fu l " trait (καταφρονητικόν. 1379031-2 '•• 
8 T h e samt- at the core ; ττροστΓοΐησ-ις έττί τ ο EACTTTOV in Aristotle AVE, 1 :08:1.2 
ττροσττοίησις έτη τα χείρον in Theophrastus ι . l ì : affectation or pretense} m either casc-
9 "Such men are more to be avoided than adde r s " 1. subßti.'-. 
10 " H e pretends not to have beard what lie heard, not to have seen what he saw. to have no 
recollection of the thing to which he agreed" 1.5 . 
11 " H e will praise to their fares those lie attacks behind their backs" 1 2 ' I find it 
astonishing that F r i e d e n d e r . 1938: Ì38 should say that Theophrastus portrays, but "does 
not e v a l u a t e , " ειρωνεία. Could there be a more emphatic devaluation than the remark 
quoted here a n d in the preceding notes^1 By leaving Socrates out of it. Theophrastus feels 
free to vent on the εϊρων the scorn he deserves in the common view. 
1 2 Aristotle too observes that your most dangerous enemies are " the quiet, dissembling, and 
unscrupulous "" -o\ π ρ ά ο ι και είρωνες και π α ν ο ύ ρ γ ο ι . hiding their evil intent under a cool 
exterior Rhet. i3Ö2b2i ) . 
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excuse for rendering eirôneia here by " i r o n y " Bloom. Grube , 
Shorey) ;13 if that translation were correct, lying would be a s tandard 
form of irony.14 
From the behavior of ειρωνεία in all of the above Attic texts from 
Aristophanes to Theophrastus one could easily j u m p to a wrong 
conclusion : because it is so commonly used to denote sly, intentionally 
deceptive speech or conduct throughout this period, must it be always 
so used of Socrates by Plato? This is what many noted Hellenists 
have assumed : Burnet/ 3 Wilamowitz.1* Guthrie. 1 7 among them. Let 
me point out how unsafe this kind of inference would be. From the 
fact that a word is used in a given sense in a multitude of cases it does 
not follow that it cannot be used in a sharply different sense in 
others. Such statistical inferences are always risky. This one is 
certainly wrong. Consider the following: 
T2 G. 4890 E: [a] Socrates: "Since by "better" you don't mean 
'stronger.' tell me again what you mean. And teach me more gently, 
admirable man. so that I wont run away from your school.f* Gallicles: 
"You are mocking me ;ΕΪρωνεύη . " 
[b] Socrates: "No, by Zctlius. whom you used earlier to do a lot of 
m o c k i n g π ο λ λ ά ε ί ρ ω ν ε υ ο υ of m e . " 1 5 
l j Bloom .1068 and Grübe ν 1974! take this 10 be the sense of ειρωνεία and dpccvEUOcio 
Shorey too j 19301 takes " i r o n y " to be [he sense of ειρωνεία (referring to Smp. 2 I 6 E . to be 
discussed below); but he shifts, without explanation, to " d i s s e m b l e " for the latter 1 
suspect he is confused about the meaning of the English ward " i r o n y , " taking it to mean 
"dissembling;. " 
14 For acceptable translations consult Lindsay. 1935 "slyness " . Gornfôrd, 194-) . " s h a m -
ming i g n o r a n c e " . Rohm, 1956 -feinte ignorance" ì . Tha t " s h a m m i n g , " " f e ign ing" U 
the sense should be completely clear from the contest . 
15 In his note on Piato. .1/J 38AI : " T h e words ε'ιρων. ειρωνεία, ειρωνεύομαι (in Plato) are only 
used of Socrates by his opponents, and have always an unfavourable meaning.** H e ia not 
overlooking είρωνευομενω at Ap. 38.Λ 1 ; '.he same sense in Allen's translation 115184. : " Y o u 
will think that 1 am being riy and dishonest. " But Burnet is ignoring or mis­
u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ? bolli of the notable uses of the u o r d in Alcibiades" speech in the 
Symposium to be discussed below . 
[6 1948: 451, n. 1 : " W o [die Ironie] dem Sokrate? beigelegt wird [im Platon] geschieht es 
immer als Vorwurf, auch von Aikibiadcs. Smp. a iÖE." Neither he nor Burnet preceding 
note' takes any notice of Ribbcck's discussion of R. 3 3 ; A , which captures exactly the sense 
of είωθυΐα ειρωνεία here 
17 " I n Plato it retains its bad sense, in the rr.outh of a bitter opponent like I 'hrasymachus or 
of one pretending to be angry at the way in which Socrates deceives c\ eryone as to his real 
character Alcibiades at Smp. -2I6E. 2180 " Guthr ie . 1969:446· . Guthrie could have 
added Ap. 38AI, ου ττεισεσθε μοι &s ε ι ρ ω ν ευ ο μένω Socrates exocets the " c o m m a n d " he 
gets from the oracle story, and the story itself, to be taken as a dishonest fiction. But G u t h r i e 
is taking no notice of £7. 489D-E -to be discussed directlv in the text above; ; and he assumes 
that in R. 337A είρων- has the same sense as at Smp. 2 I 6 E and 2 i3o. 
:8 My translation follows Croisée & Bodin, 1955. Woodhead's "you are i ronical ' is 
acceptable in [a] where the mockery is ironical .it takes the form of saving something 
contrary to what the speaker believes to be t rue: , but not at [b] , where this is not the ease. 
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In part [a] Callicles is protesting Socrates' casting himself as a pupil 
of his - a t ransparent irony, since Callicles no doubt feels that, on the 
contrary, it is Socrates who has been playing the schoolmaster right 
along. In [b] Socrates is retorting that Callicles had used the figure 
of Zethus to mock him earlier on, associating him with the latter's 
brother, the pathetic Amphion, who "despite a noble nature, puts 
on the semblance of a silly juveni le" 483E—486.V In both cases 
mockery is being protested without the slightest imputation of 
intentional deceit. In neither case is there any question of shamming, 
slyness, or evasiveness - no more so than if they had resorted to crude 
abuse, like calling each other "pig>? or " jack-ass ." 
No less instructive for my purpose is the following from the 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (a treatise of uncertain authorship, probably 
of the fourth century} :19 
T3 Eirôneia is [aj saving something while pretending not to sav it or 
[b] calling things by contrary names. 21 
At [a] we get nothing new : eironeuein is one of the many tricks of the 
trade this handbook offers the rhetorician.2" Not so at [b], as 
becomes even clearer in his example : 
τ.}. Evidenth. those good people ούτοι μεν οι χρηστοί bave done much 
evil to the allies, while we, the bad ones, have caused them many benefits 
he. cit. . 
T h e way χρηστοί is used here reminds us of the line Aristophanes 
gives Slrepsiades in the opening monologue of the Clouds : '* this good 
y o u t h " ο χρηστός ούτος νεανίας . says the old man of his good-for-
Irwin\s " ' s ly" will not d o : there is nothing particularlv " c u n n i n g , wily or hypocritical " 
O.E.D. for " s l y " . in the tone or content. Wc must also reject Ribbeck's understanding of 
the sense in [ a ) : inexpl icabh . he reads '•chicanery" into sipcovEur]. But there is nothing 
wrong with his gloss on είρωνευου at [bj "A form of mockery through false, insincere, 
p r a i s e " ' , r ightly connect ing the use of εϊρωνεύειν here with Polin \ 2.78. και τον είρωνα ένιο1 
μυκτήρα καλούσι. and the sillogiapher Tirnon's reference to Socrates |fr. 25D. ap. D.L. 
2.19), μοκτηρ ρηιορόμυκτος ύπαττικο$ είρωνευτή^. Ribbeck remaiks apropos of [b] : 
" h e n c e the c u r r e n t conception of =ίρίθνευεσθαι must have been broader than is usually 
a s s u m e d " he. di. . He should have specified more defimtelv this " w i d e r " use. T h a t 
είρωνεοεσθαι can be used to express mockery pure and simple without any insinuation of 
deceit Ribbeck does not seem to have grasped, else why " c h i c a n e r y " as the sense at [ a ] ' 
19 Long a t t r ibuted to Aristotle included in the Berlin edition of Aristotle's works . it then 
came to be ascribed to Ana\:menes of Lampsacus. a contemporarv of Theophrastus ;see 
the introduct ion by H. R a c k h a m in his translation of it in the Loeb Classical Library. 
'973'- 258fr.;. T h e ascription is far from certain, but its da te cannot be much later. Its 
linguistic a n d political ambience is that of fourth-century Athens, echoing Isocrates' Technë 
Rhetunkë. Eight fragments of it turn up in a papvrus dated by its editors in the first half of 
the third centurv Grenfell & Hunt . Hibih Papyri pt. 1, no. 26. pp. 1 1 3fF. •. 
20 Cope. 1967: 401fr . describes the form of persuasion recommended bv the treatise as " a 
system of tricks, shifts and evasions, showing an utter indifference to right and wrong, truth 
and falsehood " 
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nothing son.21 This is irony of the purest water: mockery without the 
least intention of deceit. 
Can we make sense of this state of affairs? In a mass of Attic texts 
eight of those to which I have referred; I could have added many 
more of the same kind) we find ειρωνεία implying willful mis­
representation: yet in the ninth T2) we see it standing for mockery 
entirely devoid of any such connotation and so too in part [b] of the 
tenth (T3), where a rhetorician who is thoroughly at home in fourth-
century Attic usage gives a definition of ειρωνεία which anticipates 
Quintilian so perfectly that the two definitions are precisely 
equivalent : each is a description of the same speech-act, viewed from 
the speaker's point of view in r3[b]. from the hearer's in Quintil ian. 
Is this linguistic phenomenon understandable? Yes. perfectly, if we 
remind ourselves of the parallel behavior of our word " pretending. " 
To say that a malingerer is " p r e t e n d i n g " το be sick and a con man 
" p r e t e n d i n g " to have high connections is to say that these people 
are deceivers: " t o allege falsely" is the basic use of to pretend. But 
there are contexts where " t o p r e t e n d " by-passes false allegation 
because it by-passes falsehood, as when we sav that the children arc 
" p r e t e n d i n g " that their coloured chips are money ^ 'pre tend-
money " they call them or that their dolls arc sick or die or go to 
school. In just the same way we could say that the crook in the 
example is " p r e t e n d i n g " that the stone on the trinket is a diamond 
when he offers it to his daughter, which is as far as anything from his 
pretending it is a diamond wlien putting it up to the people he is 
trying to hook. That the latter should be the most common [and. in 
point of logic, the primary use of ""pretending "" docs nothing to 
block a secondary use of the word, tangential to the first - a 
subsidiary use which is altogether innocent of intentional deceit. 
predicated on that "willing suspension of disbel ief b% which we 
enter the world of imaginative fiction in art or play. This is the sense 
of " p r e t e n d i n g " we could invoke to elucidate ironical diction, as in 
Mae West's remark: we could say she is " p r e t e n d i n g " that the 
length of the journey is her reason for declining, which would be 
patently absurd if " p r e t e n d i n g " were being used in its primary 
sense. There is no false allegation, because there is no allegation: she 
is pulling our leg. 
21 Should the reader be reminded that the occurrence of ironical speech-acts i= independent 
ot the availabili:y of a description of them as such in the speaker's language? T h e use of 
irony, as distinct from reflection on it. is as old as ihe hills. Wc can imagine a caveman 
offering a tough piece of steak to his m a t e with the remark. " T r y this tender m o r s e l . " No 
lack of examples in Homer 'EumaCUS to the " b e g g a r " : "good repute and virtue I would 
have among men. :: I were to k:ll y o u . " Od. 14.402: he means just the opposite 1 . 
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This, I suggest, gives a good explanation of the fact that though 
eirön, eirôneia, eirörieuornai are Commonly used to imply disingenuous-
ness, even so, thev are capable of an alternative use which is 
completely free of such evocation and, pace Burnet, Wilamowitz, 
Guthrie,2 2 Dover 2 3 are so used at times by Socrates in Plato. Wha t 
happened, I suggest, is this: when ειρωνεία gained currency in Attic 
use (by the last third of the fifth century at the latest), its semantic 
field was as wide as is that of'" pre tending" in present-day English, 
and eirön had strongly unfavorable connotations — was used as a term 
of denigrat ion or abuse - because the first of those two uses 
predominated heavily over the second; to be called an eiron would be 
uncompl imentary at best, insulting at the worst. But turn the pages 
of history some three hundred years — go from Greece in the fourth 
century B.C. to Rome in the first - and you will find a change which 
would be startling if long familiarity had not inured us to it. The 
word has now lost its disagreeable overtones. When Cicero, who 
loves to make transliterated Greek enrich his mother tongue, 
produces in this fashion the new Latin word, ironia, the import has 
an altogether different tone. Laundered and deodorized, it now 
betokens the height of urbanity, elegance, and good taste: 
T5 Cicero, De Oratore 2.67 : L rbana etiam dissimulano est, cum alia 
dicuntur ac sentias ... Sotratcm opinor in hac ironia dissimulamiaque longe 
lepore et humanitäre omnibus praestiiisse. Genus est perelegans et cum 
gravitate salsum...34 
And when Quinti l ian, two generations later, consolidating 
Cicero's use of the term, encapsulates its meaning in the definition 
cited above, we are no longer in any doubt that ironia has shed 
completely its disreputable past, has already become what it will 
come to be in the languages and sensibility of modern Europe: 
speech used to express a meaning that runs contrary to what is said 
— the perfect medium for mockery innocent of deceit. Subsidiary in 
the use of the paren t word in classical Greece, this now becomes the 
standard use. Eirôneia has metastasized into ironv. 
22 See nn. 15. 16. 17 above. 
23 Cf. his gloss cm Smp. 216Έ4: "ειρωνεία unlike "irony" is ' mock-mndesty '. 'pretended 
ignorance" ; in Rep. 337A T h r as ν mâchas speaks m no friendly tone' of 'Socrates ' 
accustomed ε ιρωνεία" . " Dover is assuming that ειρωνεία is used in the same sense in both 
passages. 
24. " U r b a n e is the dissimulation when what you say is quite other than what \ou 
u n d e r s t a n d . . . In this irony and dissimulation Socrates, in my opinion, far excelled all 
others in c h a r m a n d h u m a n i t y . Most elegant i= this form and seasoned in seriousness. "' 
Trans la t ing dùsimulalia here by "dissembl ing" as we may. with good war ran t from the 
dictionaries: , we should bear in mind that deceitful concealment, normally conveyed by the 
English v\ ord. is absent from the figure of speech Cicero has in view. Deceitful speech would 
not be w h a t he calls urbane dissimulation, "where the whole tenor of ν our speech shows that 
you are gravely jesting severe ludens in speaking differently from what vou t h i n k " loc. cit.]. 
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Exactly what made this happen v\e cannot say: we lack the 
massive linguistic da ta to track the upward mobility of the word. 
What, I submit, we can say is who marie it happen- Socrates. Not 
that he ever made an assault upon the word. There is no reason to 
believe he ever did. In none of our sources does he ever make eirôneia 
the F in his ' 'Wha t is the Fi" question or bring it by some other 
means under his elenctic hammer. He changes the word not by 
theorizing about it but by creating something new for it to mean : a 
new form of life realized in himself which was the very incarnation 
of ειρωνεία in that second of its contemporary uses, as innocent of 
intentional deceit as is a child's feigning that the play chips are 
money, as free from shamming as are honest games, though, unlike 
games, serious in its mockery cum granitale salsum', dead earnest in its 
playfulness (severe ludens . a previously unknown, unimagincd tvpe of 
personality, so arresting to his contemporaries and so memorable for 
ever after, that the time would come, centuries after his death, when 
educated people would hardly be able to think of ironia without its 
bringing Socrates to mind. And as this happened the meaning of the 
word altered. The image of Socrates as the paradeigmatic eirön 
effected a change in the previous connotation of the word . " 
Through the eventual influence of the after-image of its Socratic 
incarnation, the use \s hieb, had been marginal in the classical period 
became its central, its normal and normative use: eirôneia became 
ironia. 
I have made a large claim. What is there in our sources to show 
that Socrates really -.vas the arch-ironist Cicero and Quintilian 
thought him? 
Nothing in Aristophanes. The anti-hero of the Clouds is many 
things to many men. but an ironist to none: too solemn by half as 
natural philosopher, sage or hierophant. too knavish26 as a preceptor 
of the young. Nor is he represented as an ironist in the sideswipe at 
him in the Frogs (1491-91. The portrait is now appreciably different. 
Outside the thinkerv - else the question of an ordinary Athenian 
35 A change so drastic as io eclipse the original meaning of the word from Cicero's and 
Quinti l ian s view The occultation seems total : from what the, sav about tnnia we would 
never guess that in tevts the\ knew well its Greek originai hud been a Schimpften. The 
authority of the Socratic paradigm becomes so definitive for Cicero dial he is content to 
understand by the word s imph " t h a t ir orna . found m Socrates, which he deploys in the 
dialogues of Pinto, Xenophon. and Aeschines" 'Brutus 292 And when Quintil ian remarks 
that " i ron i a may characterize a man's whole life'' he refers to Socrates and onl \ 10 him 
Imi. Or 9 2.φ . 
26 T h o u g h he does not himself inculcate crooked argument he panders to the d e m a n d for it. 
He keeps both this and its opposite the δίκαιος and the άδικος Aóyos on the premises and 
the customer can have his choice. Cf. Nussbaum. 19801 48: "Throughou t the play Socrates 
makes no at tempt to teach justice and to urge the just use of rhetorical skill His alt i tude 
is at best neut ra l : ai worst he condones decei t ." 
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picking a seat next to him would not arise - he is no longer a sinister 
figure. But he is still a quibbler, whose hair-splitting solemnities (ετπ 
σευνοϊσιν λόγοισι και σχαριφπσμοΐσι λήρων, 1496—7)) engulf his 
inter locutors in tasteless triviality. No hint of irony in this pretentious 
idler's chat te r . 
We t u r n to X e n o p h o n . At first it looks as though neither here shall 
we find w h a t we are looking for. Through most of the Memorabilia 
this tirelessly didactic, monotonously earnest, Socrates appears to 
have no more jesting, mocking, or riddling in his soul than the 
atheistic n a t u r a l philosopher and " highpriest of subtlest poppy­
c o c k " 2 7 of the Aristophanic caricature. But once in a while we get a 
flash of something different,2 8 and then, in chapter 1 1 of book in, we 
get a big break. Here Socrates turns skittish and goes to pay a visit 
to the beautiful T h c o d o t e . 2 9 He offers her suggestions to enlarge her 
clientele and she invites him to become her partner in the pursuit of 
philoi. H e demurs, pleading much business, both private and public, 
and a d d i n g : 
T6 Xenophon. .Mem. 3.11.16: " I have my own girlfriends .philai) who 
won't leave me dav or night, learning from me philters and enchantments. "" 
Since she is m e a n t to see, and does see. that these "girlfriends'" are 
philosophers. 3 " depressingly male and middle-aged, there is no 
quest ion of her being misled into thinking that her visitor has a stable 
of pret ty girls to whom he teaches love-potions. So here at last we do 
get something Cicero and Quintilian would recognize as ironia, 
though hard ly a gem of the genre : its humor is too arch and strained. 
After the visit to Theodote. Socrates in the .Memorabilia resumes 
his p la l i tudinously wholesome moralizing. But he snaps out of it for 
good in X e n o p h o n ' s Symposium.31 There we see what he might have 
been in the Memorabilia if the severely apologetic aims o f tha t woik 
had not toned down the hues of its Socratic portrait to shades of 
gray. T h e convivial mise-en-scène of the drinking-party prompts 
X e n o p h o n to paint bright, even garish, colours into the picture. 
Asked what is that a r t of his in which he takes great pride he says it 
is the art of the procurer imastropos, 4-56), Challenged to a beauty-
contest by the handsome Critobulus (5. iff.), he pleads the superior 
27 Clouds, 339, in Arrowsmïth 's [1962) translation. 
2ÌÌ K ie rkegaa rd , 1965. notes .5Ö-9 and 64; flashes of iron y in the dialogue with Charicles 
[1.2.36fr.] and Hippias .4.4.6;. 
29 H e r e K ie rkegaa rd ' s laste, usually faultless, deserts him. He finds the episode "d isgus t ing" 
1965: 6 1 - 2 ' . 
30 H e names Apcl lodorus and Antisthenes, his inseparables, and also his frequent visitors 
from T h e b e s . Cebes and Simmias 13.9-17). 
31 For shrewd apprecia t ion of irony in this work see the comments on the goings-on at the 
d r ink ing pa r ty in Higgins. 1977: 15-20. Full discussion of the same material also in 
Edelstein, 1935: 11-12. though curiously enough she does not perceive it as irony. 
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beauty of his own ugliest features - his snub nose, his oversized 
flaring nostrils - on the ground that useful is beautiful [5.6). Here we 
see a new form of irony, unprecedented in Greek literature to my 
knowledge, which is peculiarly Socradc. For want of a better name, 
I shall call it "complex irony'"32 to contrast it with the simple ironies 
I have been dealing with in this chapter heretofore. In " s i m p l e " 
irony what is said just isn't what is meant: taken in its ordinary, 
commonly understood, sense the statement is simply false. In 
'•complex" irony what is said both is and isn't what is m e a n t : its 
surface content is meant to be true in one sense, false in another. 
Thus when Socrates says lie is a "procurer ' 1 he does not. and yet 
does, mean what he says. He obviously does not in the common, 
vulgar, sense of the word. But nonetheless he does in another sense 
he gives the word ad hoc. making it mean someone '"who makes the 
procured attractive to those whose company he is to k e e p " 4.57). 
Xenophon's Socrates can claim he does exactly that. Again, when he 
says that his flat, pushed-in nose, his protruding eyes, and his large. 
flaring nostrils are beautiful, he does not, and yet does, mean what 
he says. In the ordinary sense of the word he would be the first to 
deny that they are. But if by "beaut i ful" he were allowed to mean 
"well made for their required function" [5.4), then he would have 
us know that his particular sort of eyes and nose are superlatively 
beautiful: unlike the deep-set ones of fashion-models, his can see 
sideways, not merely straight ahead; his nose is a more efficient vent 
than that of the currently admired profile 5.5—6). 
Undoubtedly then there is an authentic streak of irony in 
Xenophon's depiction of Socraies.33 But for the purpose of assuring 
us that it was really Socrates who played the critical role in the 
mutation of eirôneia into irony, what Xenophon tells us about 
Socrates would still be defective in important ways. 
In the first place, the ironies Xenophon puts into the portrait have 
little doctrinal significance. They contribute nothing to the 
elucidation of Socrates' philosophy because Xenophon system-
atically ignores those very features of it which Socrates wants to be 
understood as "complex ironies"' of the sort he illustrates in making 
his hero say he is a procurer and has a charming nose. I mean the 
32 Γ shall be employing this term here and hereafter throughout the book as a quasi-technical 
term, harking back to my introduction of it in Vlastos, 1985- iff at 30. 
33 So it is understandable that Cicero Brutus 292 : cf. η. 2 j abo\e ' should speak of Socratic 
ironia in the dialogues of Xenophon (as weil as Aeschines) along with those of Plato. But 
it is only to the latter that he turns tc illustrate it and in doing so it is clear tiiat the Socrates 
he has in view (."ignorant of everything," omnium rerum t'nsctttm" could not be the 
Xenophontic figure, though it could be the Aeschinean: see fr. 1 : translated in addit ional 
note 1.4 below, and quoted again as T21 in chapter 3 , " I had no knowledge through 
which I could benefit him by teaching it to h i m . " 
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great philosophical paradoxes of which we hear in Plato's earlier 
dialogues, like Socrates' disavowal of knowledge and of teaching.34 
Each of these is intelligible only as a complex irony. When he 
proiesses to have no knowledge he both does and does not mean 
what he says. H e wants it to assure his hearers that in the moral 
domain there is not a single proposition he claims to know with 
certainty. But in another sense of " knowledge, " where the word 
refers to justified true belief-justifiable through the peculiarly 
Socratic method of elenctic argument - there are many propositions 
he docs claim to know.3 0 So too, I would argue, Socrates' parallel 
disavowal of teaching should be understood as a complex irony. In 
the conventional sense, where to " teach" is simply to transfer 
knowledge from a teacher's to a learner's mind, Socrates means what 
he says: that sort of teaching he does not do. But in the sense which 
he would give to " t each ing" - engaging would-be learners in elenctic 
argument to make them aware of their own ignorance and enable 
them to discover for themselves the truth the teacher had held back 
— in that sense of " t e a c h i n g " Socrates would want to say that he is 
a teacher, the only true teacher: his dialogue with his fellows is 
meant to have, and does have, the effect of evoking and assisting 
their own effort at moral self-improvement.3fi 
In the second piare, the words eirôneia, eirön, eiröneuomai are never 
applied to Socrates in Xenophon's Socratic writings either by 
Xenophon himself or by anyone else. If we had only Xenophon's 
picture of Socrate^ we would have no reason to think that Socrates' 
contemporaries had thought of eirôneia as a distinctively Socratic 
trait. That noun and its cognate verb, so conspicuous in Thrasyma-
chus' at tack on Socrates in τ ι above, drop out when the identical 
reproach is ventilated by Hippias in the Memorabilia. This is how the 
complaint is now made to read: 
Ty Xen. Mem. 4-4.9:3, "We've had enough of vour ridiculing oihers, 
questioning and refuting everyone, while never willing to render an 
account yourself to anyone or state your own opinion about anvthing. " 
T h e reference in τ ι to Socrates" " h a b i t u a l eirôneia'' has been washed 
out.38 
34 O n these complex ironies and a third. closeh associated with them, see addit ional note i . i . 
35 T h e textual basis for this claim is set forth in considerable detail m Vlastos. 1985 at pp. 
6-1 1 . 
36 He says he is " o n e of the few Athenians, not to say the only one. to undertake ΕτηχΕίρεΐν 
cf. addi t iona l note r . i . n. 21 the true political a r t " [G. 52ΙΟΊ in a context in which the 
criterion for the pract ice of this art is one's effect on the moral character of one's fellow -
townsmen G 315Λ). Both texts are discussed in additional note I . I . 
37 Q u o t e d more fully as T25 in chapter 3. 
38 Nor does any other of Socrates ' interlocutors ever say or imply in Xenophon that Socrates 
is an ΕΪρων. He is never represented there as producing on friend or foe the impression he 
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Fortunately, we have Plato's Socratic dialogues where what 
Xenophon denies us is supplied in such abundance that to go 
through all of it would be work for a whole bnnk Forced ro be 
selective,3 9 I shall concentrate on one piece of it - the half dozen 
pages or so that make up the speech of Alcibiades in Plato's 
Symposium. Despite the provenance of this composition from a 
dialogue of Plato's middle period, its Socrates is unmistakably the 
philosopher of the earlier one : 4 0 he is portrayed as voicing that total 
disavowal of knowledge 4 1 which is so striking a feature of the 
Socrates of the earlier period who, as I shall be arguing in chapter 
2, is Plato's re-creation of the historical figure. The discourse of 
Diotima which Socrates professes to report in his own speech in the 
Symposium is as strong an affirmation of Plato's i/rcSocratic doctrine of 
transcendent Forms 4 2 as is anything he ever wrote. But Alcibiades 
has not heard what Socrates says he learned from Diotima. He joins 
the drinking-party after Socrates has finished. In the speech about 
Socrates Alcibiades now proceeds to deliver, the last in the Symposium. 
Plato brings back to life the earlier imPlatonic Socrates as surelv as 
he does also in book ι of the Republic.** He ushers us into the Republic 
through a Socratic portico and escorts us out of (he Symposium 
through a Socratic back-porch. 4 4 
The key sentence in Alcibiades' speech is 
TO Smp. 216F4: '"He spends his entire life eiröiuuomenos and jesting with 
people." 
How- shall we read eircneuomenos? When Quintilian Inst. O, 9.2.46 
remarks that ironia may characterize not just a text or a speech but 
" a n entire life''' vita universa Socrates is his only example. So we 
know how ht would have read liröneuomcnos in the text. But time and 
again it is read differently by scholars. Guthrie4 ' rakes it to refer to 
"" the way in which Socrates deceives everyone as to his real 
character ." Dover,46 assimilating it to τ ι above, denying that the 
word means " ' i rony" here, takes it to refer to Socrates' " pretended 
ignorance." Suzy Groden translates, 
makes on Alcibiades in Plato of being habitually and ckaradcnïtically ironical the sense of 
ΕΪρωνικώΐ at rg below, as I shall be arguing in glossing that text ' . T h e people to whom he 
sa\s in Xenophon's Symposium that he is a procurer and has lovely facial features do 
understand, of course, that he is speaking ironically: but they gi\e no indication of 
recognizing this as a i.abiuijl Socratic trait. 39 Bu: see also section π of chapter 5. 
40 T h e multiple differences between lhe.-e two perìodi of Plato's h'terarv output in its 
portraval of Socrates will be discussed in chapter 1. 
41 2 I 6 D ·. = Tt5 below) : " h e knows nothing and is ignorant of everything " 
42 To be discussed in section ui of chapter 2 See especiallv the gloss on T22 there. 
43 See additional note 2 1 " 'The composition of Rep I**). 
44 Similarly in the Phaedo authentic Socratic material is used to introduce '57A -64a' and cap 
; t i5A to the end) the no less authentically Platonic philosophical argument of the 
dialogue 4.3 Guthrie. 1369: ^46. 46 See n. 23 above. 
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He pretends [my emphasis] to be ignorant and spends his whole life putting 
people on. 
and W. Hamilton. 
He spends his whole life pretending [my emphasis] and playing with people. 
If we follow Quinti l ian we shall understand Alcibiades to be saying 
that Socrates is a lifelong ironist. If we follow Guthrie &. Co. we shall 
understand him to be saying that Socrates is a lifelong deceiver. 
Since, as I explained above, the latter was the most common of the 
current uses of the word, the presumption should indeed be that 
these scholars are right. So if one believes that, on the contrary, 
Quintilian's reading is the right one. one must assume the burden of 
proof. I gladly assume it. 
But Τ must start with another sentence in Alcibiades" speech which 
is equally important for my thesis, for here again the critical word is 
applied not to what Socrates says in this or that passage but to his 
usual, characteristic, way of speaking: 
Tg Smp. 21806—7: " H e heard me out. then, most viromkos. in his 
extremely characteristic and habitual*' manner, he said..."* 
Here Groden and Hamilton translate, respectively. 
" H e answered in that extremely ironical way he always uses [my emphasis]. 
very characteristically." 
" l i e made a thoroughly characteristic reply in his usual ironical style [my 
emphasis]. "' 
Thus of their own accord both of them give me all I want. Do they 
realize what they are doing? Do they see that they are welshing on 
their previous translation of eironeuomenos in τ8? I don't know and I 
don' t need to know. It suffices that here Plato's text allows no other 
choice. 
Let us recall the context, το, comes at the climax of the piece de 
resistance of Alcibiades' speech: his narration of an episode from his 
distant youth, when he was still in his " bloom '" - that final phase in 
a boy's transition to manhood, which in that culture marked the 
peak of his physical attractiveness to males older than himself. The 
story begins as follows: 
n o Smp. 217.4.: "Believing that he was seriously smitten by my bloom. I 
thought it a windfall, a wondeiful piece of luck, since by allowing him my 
favors I would be able to learn from him all he knew." 
47 εϊωθοτως. with which cf. ε^ωθυΤα ειρωνεία in π above. 
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The project of swapping sex for moral wisdom may seem incredible 
today. It would not have seemed so in the least to someone in 
Alcibiades' circumstances at the time. Let me enumerate t h e m : 
1 ) As we know from Pausanias" speech in the Symposium 
2 I 8 D 6 219A), this is -he norm (nomos) in the higher form of 
pederastie love: the boy gives "favors." the man gives intellectual 
and moral improvement. 
2) Alcibiades already had ^and knew he h a d · : 4 8 that asset to 
which he was to owe throughout his life so much of his unprincipled 
success: stunning beauty and grace.3 9 
(3) We know from other Platonic dialogues0 0 and from Xenophon 
too 5 1 that Socrates has a high susceptibility to male beauty to which 
a sexy teenager could hardly have failed to resonate.q~ 
4'» Socrates does not answer questions, does not expound his 
"wisdom."' Pieces of it spill out in elenctic arguments, leaving the 
interlocutor wondering how much is being held back. 
(5) We know- that the speaker is a highlv acratic character. He 
starts his whole speech with a confession: 
τι 1 Smp. 210B3--5: " I know that I cannot contradici him and I should 
do as he bids, but when 1 am away from him I am defeated bv the adulation 
of the crowd.'" 
There is no reason to think that he was different as a teenager. 
Put those five things together and it should not seem strange if a 
boy who longs to become a "good and noble m a n " \kalos kagathos 
should get it into his head thai the key to what he wanted was hidden 
away in the vast, undisclosed store of wisdom in Socrates, who might 
be induced to slip him the key were he to offer as a quid pro quo 
something as irresistibly attractive to all the men of his acquaintance 
as w as his own superlative " bloom. "' He pursues the project 
methodically, going through all the ploys in the current repertoire of 
48 217A5-6, " I had a uonderful opinion of my bloom."" 
49 Cf W Ferguson in the Cambridge Ar.ciml Histor, ν Cambridge. 1935 . 263: "* Ar res tingi y 
handsome, he recewed from men in Athens the recognition and privilege- oidinanly given 
in other societies :o e\.traordi-tar\ beauty in women: a r d his in-o!e:icc iie draped in such 
charm of manner that, when he showed respect for neither gods nor men, aye nor 
a u t h o n t \ . guardian nor «ile, t:ie outrageousness of the act was often forgotten and only 
the air of the actor remembered." 
on Pri. 3 0 9 A : G. 4810; Chrm. 153C-E: Men. 7601-2. 51 Xen. Smp. 8.2. 
52 Xenophon Mem. 3 1 r 3 adds the precious information which we ne\er get from Plato 
that Socrates is also suscepnble to female beauty. The sight of the scantih clad Thecdote 
makes Socrates .speaking for himse.f and his companions " l o n g to touch what we saw; 
we shall go awa\ excited Οττοκυιζομενο:; and with longing —οθήσομεν/." 
φ 
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homosexual seduction. 5 3 But nothing works. Socrates remains 
fr iendly b u t d i s tanL. W h e n A l c i b i a d e s w a n t s to h e a r t h e sweet 
nothings of love all he gets is elenctic argument, more of the same old 
thing. Finally he sets Socrates up and blurts out his proposition. 
Here is the response he gets: 
τι2 Smp. 2I8D6—219AI : " H e heard me out. Then, most eirönikös, in his 
extremely characteristic and habitual manner.54 he said: 'Dear Alcibiades, 
it looks as though you are not stupid pkaulos), if what you say about me is 
true and there rcallv is in mc some power which could make you a better 
man: you must be seeing something inconceivably beautiful in me, 
enormously superior to your good looks. If that is what you see and you 
want to exchange beauty for beauty, you mean to take a huge advantage 
of me: you are trying to get true beauty in exchange for seeming beauty 
- " gold for brass"". 
Here, I submit, it is mcontestably clear that "ironically"7 has to be 
the sense of eirönikös, for the context gives no foothold to the notion 
of pretence or deceit. Socrates is turning down flat the proposed 
exchange, saying it is a swindle. He starts off with a simple irony, 
saying to Alcibiades. "you are not stupid." when he clearly means: 
"you are stupid, very stupid: what could be more stupid than to 
think I would fall for a barter of gold for brass?" When stich a thing 
happens in those verses of the Iliad he echoes here -- Glaucus 
exchanges his golden armour for one of brass — the poet explains: 
"Zeus had taken away his wits."0 0 Socrates is saying to Alcibiades: 
" I would have to be out of my head to buy your proposal: what a 
fool you must think mc. a complete ass. to think that I would let you 
pull it off. " 
He winds up with a "complex" 0" irony: 
T13 Smp, 219A1-3: "But look more closely, blessed bow lest you have 
missed that I am nothing. The mind's vision grows sharp onlv when the 
eyesight has passed its peak, and vou are still far from that." 
Alcibiades is told that the " g o l d " he has been looking for isn't there 
after all. If moral wisdom is to be understood as Alcibiades 
understands it — as the i>ort ofthing which can be handed o\ er in a 
swap, Socrates will insist that he has absolutely none: qua repository 
of such wisdom he is "no th ing . " Ί ο say this is not to deny that he 
does have wisdom of another sort which Alcibiades could have for 
free if he would seek it himself, looking to Socrates not as a guru but 
53 T h o u g h here the roles are reversed : the bov is chasing, not chased 
54 This first par t o f T i s was cited as T9 above. 55 P.. 6.234. 
56 Pp. 31-2 above and additional note. 1.1. 
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as a partner in the search. 3 7 T o find deception anywhere in this 
speech we would have to plant it there ourselves: there is not a 
shadow of the will to mislead in what Socrates has said to Alcibiades 
most eirönikös. 
Does that settle the sense of eiröneuomenos at τ8? Xo. But it does 
create a presumption that there too the sense is the same: it would 
be unlikely that eirönikös would be used as we have now seen it used 
in το, if just two Stephanus pages earlier " h e spends his entire life 
eiröneuomenos" had carried the thought that Socrates went through 
life "'deceiving everyone as to his real character."*8 So let us look as 
closely into the context there - the paragraphs in Alcibiades' speech 
which precede immediately the seduction story. They are pursuing 
the famous simile with which the whole speech had begun : 
T14 Smp. 215A/-B3: " I maintain that he is very like those Sileni that sit 
in the workshops o: the statuaries... who, when opened into two.59 turn out 
to have images of gods inside. " 
This is the picture of a man who Ii\ es behind a mask - a mysterious. 
enigmatic ligure, a man nobody knows: "Vou should know that 
none of you know h i m " :216c D), says Alcibiades to Socrates' 
friends. To say this is not at all to imply that Socrates has been 
deceiving them: to be reserved and to be deceitful are not the same 
thing. All we can get from the simile is concealment/0 not deceit. 
Even so, we have to ask if Alcibiades docs not insinuate deceit in his 
own explication of the simile: 
T15 Smp. 216D2-3: "You -*ee that [a] Socrates is crotically disposed 
towards beautiful youths, always hanging round them, smitten by them; 
and again [bj that he knows nothing and is ignorant of everything ... Isn't 
this like Silcnus? Enormously so." 
37 Cf. Socrates' behavior in the Laches. The moral wisdom he is asked to suppK on demand 
he disclaims strenuously: " h e has no knowledge of that thing, nor the abiliti to judge 
which of you speaks truly [of i t ] ; he has not been discoverer or learner of anything of the 
kind " I 8 6 D - E , But when Laches offers himself to Socrates for instruction iSgct he is 
welcomed - not to have knowledge poured into him by someone else, but to join with 
Sociales in '* common counsel and search " συμβουλεύειν K C t l συσκοτπ-ΐν the prefix conv eys 
twice over the cooperative nature of the relation . 58 So Guthrie. 1975. 
59 T h e image of "opening up ' to disclose something infinitely precious, which is concealed 
from the vulgar view, recurs at S I 6 D 6 , 2 I 6 E O . 222A. I see no foundation in any of these texts 
for M a r t h a Nussbaum's notion that the image, as used by Plato, is "essentially sexual" 
198Ó: r8g'.. There is profound truth m her thought that in sexual intimacy a unique form 
of knowledge of the beloved person is acquired: in our desire for it, she remarks, "sexual 
and epistemologica! [ep:.-ternie] need are joined and. apparently, inseparable" 
.Ί986: 190·. But Plato's text gives no warrant for reading :his thought into it; Alcibiades 
is not suggesting to his fellow-drinkers at 216D-E that the real Socrates would be revealed 
" o p e n e d u p " , to him or to them through sexual intimacy. 
60 Cf. my gloss in n. 24 above on dissimttlaniia in Cicero's description of Socratic ironia. 
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